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Abstract
This paper examines the issue of the first-mover and second-mover advantage in a vertical structure
in which each manufacturer trades with a separated retailer via two-part tariffs. Compared to the
canonical result in one-tier market, we find that the manufacturers’ preference orderings over se-
quential versus simultaneous play are reversed in a vertical structure. We show that the Stackelberg
leader (Stackelberg follower) had the first (second)-mover advantage in the downstream Cournot
(Bertrand) competition. The first (second)-mover advantage compels its manufacturer to set the
wholesale price higher than that of rival. Finally, we show that the manufacturer in which its
retailer moves second (first) in a downstream Stackelberg Cournot (Bertrand) competition earns
higher profits than the other in which its retailer moves first (second) in a downstream Stackelberg
Cournot (Bertrand) competition.
JEL Classification: D43, L13, L14.
Keywords: First- and Second-mover Advantage, Two-part Tariffs, Vertical Structure.
1 Introduction
There is a large literature on first- and second-mover advantages. Usually, analyzing the effects of the
strategic decision on either delay or preemption matter is an important topic. According to a well-
known result in oligopoly theory, a sequential-move quantity game yields a higher aggregate-industry
output level and a lower market price than do simultaneous-move quantity games. Furthermore,
the leader’s (follower’s) profit under a sequential-move quantity game is higher (lower) than under
simultaneous-move quantity games, which implies that firms enjoy a first-mover advantage. In con-
trast, both leader and follower collect a higher profit under a sequential-move price game than under
simultaneous-move price games. However, the firm (i.e., the leader) that sets its price first makes a
lower profit than the firm (i.e., the follower) that sets its price second, which implies that firms enjoy
a second-mover advantage1. Comparing Cournot and Bertrand competition under either sequential or
simultaneous decision-making, these works suggest some important implications for the determination
of market outcomes.
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The existing literature has produced an array of extensions of the Stackelberg model. In one
strand of extensions and generalizations of the Stackelberg model, Boyer and Moreaux (1987), Mailath
(1993), Albaek (1990), Hamilton and Slutsky (1990), and Amir and Jin (2001), for example, reveal
counter-results based on the original framework by allowing for a wider range of cost and demand
asymmetries. In another strand of extensions and generalizations of Singh and Vives (1984), Dastidar
(1997), Qiu (1997), Lambertini (1997), and Hackner (2000), among others, deal with the choice of
strategic variables for prices or quantities and suggest important implications for the determination
of market outcomes in a one-tier duopoly. On the other hand, Lopez (2007) examines the Bertrand-
Cournot ranking of profits in a duopoly model with union. Lopez (2007) shows that Bertrand profits
may exceed Cournot profits when decentralized bargaining over labor cost is introduced. Arya et al.
(2008) explore the standard conclusions about duopoly competition when the production of a key
input is outsourced to a vertically integrated retail competitor with upstream market power. They
show that Bertrand competition leads to higher prices, higher industry profits, lower consumer surplus,
and lower total surplus than does Cournot competition.
We address the issue of first- and second-mover advantages under both Cournot and Bertrand
competition in a vertically related market, in which each upstream firm trades with each downstream
firm through a two-part tariff contract. In fact, even though our issue was analyzed in one-tier market
of the industrial organization context, the potential impact of vertical structure was not theoretically
incorporated when each manufacturer sells its product to its own retailer. The paper that is closely
related to the present model of first- and second-mover advantages includes Lee et al. (2014) in
our companion paper. Lee et al. (2014) showed that in which a monopolistic upstream firm trades
with two competing downstream firms through two-part tariffs. They showed that the profit of the
upstream firm and social welfare are equal between Cournot and Bertrand competition regardless
of both simultaneous- and sequential-move games. However, when the market structure involves
sequential- or simultaneous-moves in a vertically related market, one issue that remains is whether the
above results are robust or not when each manufacturer trades with a separated retailer via two-part
tariffs. This paper compares such situations with both simultaneous- and sequential-move games in a
vertically related market. Notably, our paper is the first study to consider a case in which prices or
quantities are set with a simultaneous- or sequential-move game between two downstream firms in a
vertically related duopoly.
The main result of our paper is as follows. Contrast to the canonical results in one-tier market,
we find that incorporating the issue of first- and second-mover advantages under both Cournot and
Bertrand competition into a vertically related market yields completely reversed, borrowing the setting
of Lee et al. (2014). This is because each upstream firm in each channel controls first- and second-
mover advantages by adjusting input prices under either Cournot or Bertrand competition when the
market structure involves sequential or simultaneous moves. The intuition behind main results is as
follows. Since input prices under Cournot competition are strategic substitutes, each upstream firm
sets the input price to be below its marginal cost when the market structure involves simultaneous-
move. Thus, each downstream firm sets the final-good price to be above its marginal cost, which
enhancing each upstream firm’s profit. However, when the market structure involves sequential-move,
the leader’s upstream firm sets the input price to be equal to its marginal cost, while the follower’s
upstream firm sets the input price to be below its marginal cost. That is, under Cournot competition,
such lower input pricing of follower’s upstream firm forces the downstream firm of the Stackelberg
follower to be aggressive in producing output and yields higher profit of the follower’s upstream firm
than the leader’s upstream firm. On the other hand, since input prices under Bertrand competition
are strategic complements, each upstream firm sets the input price to be above its marginal cost
when the market structure involves simultaneous move. However, when the market structure involves
sequential move, the follower’s upstream firm sets the input price to be above its marginal cost,
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while the leader’s upstream firm sets the input price to be equal to its marginal cost. Hence, the
follower’s upstream firm has incentive to remove the second-mover advantage of downstream firm.
Thus, we show that even if there exists a first-mover (second-mover) advantage at the downstream
competition, the upstream firm resolves the first-mover (second-mover) advantage by providing for
differential input prices to the downstream firms. As a result, we show that when the goods are
substitutes, the upstream firm in which its retailer moves second (first) in a downstream Stackelberg
Cournot (Bertrand) competition earns higher profits than the other in which its retailer moves first
(second) in a downstream Stackelberg Cournot (Bertrand) competition, and vice versa when the goods
are complements.
Our study differs from the existing literature in at least two important aspects. First, rather
than compare simultaneous- and sequential-move games under Bertrand or Cournot competition in
a vertical structure, existing studies focus on negotiated input prices. Second, previous studies focus
on simultaneous- move games while comparing Bertrand and Cournot profits in one-tier market. In
contrast, this paper presents upstream profit and social welfare comparisons between simultaneous-
and sequential-move games under both Bertrand and Cournot competition in a vertically related
market, in which each upstream firm trades with two downstream firms through a two-part tariff
contract. To the best of the authors’ knowledge, Mukherjee et al. (2012) and Alipranti et al. (2014)
are the only studies that are closely related to our vertical structure model. Mukherjee et al. (2012)
compare Cournot with Bertrand competition in a vertical structure where the timing of games is not
provided, assuming price discrimination by an upstream firm and homogeneous final goods. Alipranti
et al. (2014) demonstrated that the results drawn from a comparison between Cournot and Bertrand
competition are reversed in a vertically related market with upstream monopoly and trading via
two-part tariffs. They only focus on a comparison between Bertrand and Cournot competition with
simultaneously negotiated input prices.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we describe the model. In Section
3, we consider the bench mark case of Cournot and Bertrand simultaneous-move games. Section 4
considers the Cournot and Bertrand sequential-move game. The concluding remarks appear in Section
5.
2 The Model
Consider a manufacturing duopoly in which each upstream firm (i.e., manufacture) sells its product
to its own downstream firm (i.e., retailer). The inverse and direct demands for downstream firm are:
pi = 1− qi − bqj , and qi = 1− b− pi + bpj
1− b2 ; i, j = 1, 2, i 6= j, (1)
where qi and qj are the outputs, pi and pj are the retail prices charged for final product i and j,
respectively. The parameter b, with b ∈ [0, 1], of the demand function measures the degree of horizontal
differentiation. As b approaches one, the products become less differentiated, and as b approaches
zero, the products become more differentiated. Each product is produced with the marginal cost of
c. For simplicity, there are no retailing costs. We also assume that each upstream firm prohibits its
downstream from transacting and distributing the product produced by the rival upstream firm, and
that only one downstream firm serves a given upstream firm.
We posit a three-stage game. At stage one, each upstream firm offers a contract to its own
downstream firm. The contract is composed of two variables; wholes price wi and franchise fee Fi.
At stage two, downstream firm j (leader) sets the outputs qj (retail price pj) in Stackelberg Cournot
(Bertrand) competition. At stage three, downstream firm i (follower) sets the output qi (retail price
pi) in Stackelberg Cournot (Bertrand) competition.
3
3 Benchmark
3.1 Cournot Simultaneous-move Game
We first consider the Cournot competition in which downstream firm simultaneously sets a quantity.
At stage two, given the two-part tariffs contract and downstream firm j’s quantity, downstream firm i
sets the quantity so as to maximize its profit. Downstream firm i’s maximization problem is as follows:
max
qi
pii = (pi − wi)qi − Fi = (1− bqj − qi − wi)qi − Fi; i, j = 1, 2, i 6= j.
where wi is the wholesale price and Fi is the franchise fee. Downstream firm i chooses its output as
the function of wholesale prices as follows:
qi =
2− b− 2wi + bwj
4− b2 , qj =
2− b− 2wj + bwi
4− b2 ,
We obtain the equilibrium retail price pi and profit pii as follows:
pi =
2− b+ (2− b2)wi + bwj
4− b2 , pii =
(2− b− 2wi + bwj)2
4− b2 − Fi.
At stage one, upstream firm i’s maximization problem is as follows:
max
wi,Fi
ui = (wi − c)qi + Fi s.t. pii = (pi − wi)qi − Fi ≥ 0.
Note that the above constraint is binding. Therefore, we rewrite the above maximization problem as
follows:
max
wi
ui = (pi − c)qi = (2− b− 2wi + bwj)[(2− b)(1− wi)− c(4− b
2) + bwj ]
(4− b2)2 .
The equilibrium wholesale for upstream firm i is derived as follows:
wCi = c−
b2θ
4 + 2b− b2 .
Using 1−c = θ, the equilibrium of the first stage for a simultaneous-move game is described in Lemma
1.
Lemma 1: Under Eq. (1), if each upstream firm offers a two-part tariffs contract to its downstream
firm, the equilibrium wholesale prices, retail prices, quantities, and the upstream firms’ profits and
fixed fees are respectively given by
qCi =
2θ
4 + 2b− b2 , w
C
i = c−
b2θ
4 + 2b− b2 , p
C
i = c+
(2− b2)θ
4 + 2b− b2 ,
uCi =
2(2− b2)θ2
(4 + 2b− b2)2 , F
C
i =
4θ2
(4 + 2b2 − b2)2 .
where the superscript ‘C’ denotes Cournot simultaneous-move game.
Note that the wholesale prices are strategic substitutes. In other words, if upstream firm j decreases
wholesale price wj , downstream firm j increases quantity qj . On the other hand, the output function
for downstream firm i shifts to downward. Consequently, profit function for upstream firm i shifts
down to the right2. Each upstream firm sets its wholesale price to be below its marginal cost in order
to be beneficial in downstream competition.
2The second cross derivative function for upstream firm i’s profit function is ∂2ui/∂wi∂wj < 0. Therefore, the
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3.2 Bertrand Simultaneous-move Game
We now consider Bertrand competition in which each downstream firm simultaneously sets a retail
price.
At stage two, given the two-part tariffs contract and downstream firm j’s price, downstream firm i
sets the price pi so as to maximize its profit. Downstream firm i’s maximization problem is as follows:
max
pi
pii =
(pi − wi)(1− b− pi + bpj)
1− b2 − Fi; i, j = 1, 2, i 6= j.
We obtain the equilibrium prices in terms of wholesale prices, wi and wj .
pi =
2− b− b2 + 2wi + bwj
4− b2 .
We obtain the equilibrium quantity and profit as follows:
qi =
2− b− b2 − (2− b2)wj + bwi
(4− b2)(1− b2) , pii =
[2− b− b2 − (2− b2)wi + bwj ]2
(4− b2)2(1− b2) − Fi.
At stage one, the upstream firm i’s maximization problem is as follows:
max
wi,Fi
ui = (wi − c)qi + Fi s.t. pii = (pi − wi)qi − Fi ≥ 0.
Note that the above constraint is binding. Therefore, we rewrite the above maximization problem as
follows:
max
wi
ui = (pi − c)qi = [2− b− b
2 − (2− b2)wi + bwj ][2− b− b2 − (4− b2)c+ 2wi + bwj ]
(4− b2)2(1− b2) .
From the above maximization problem, we obtain the equilibrium wholesale prices wi as follows.
wBi = c+
b2(1− b)θ
4− 2b− b2 .
Note that each upstream firm sets the wholesale price to be above its marginal cost as wholesale prices
are strategic complements under Bertrand competition3.
Using 1 − c = θ, the equilibrium of the first stage for a simultaneous-move game is described in
Lemma 2.
Lemma 2: Under Eq. (1), if each upstream firm offers a two-part tariffs contract to its own down-
stream firm, the equilibrium wholesale prices, retail prices, output, and the upstream firm’s profit and
fixed fee are respectively given by
wBi = c+
b2(1− b)θ
4− 2b− b2 , p
B
i = c+
2(1− b)θ
4− 2b− b2 ,
qBi =
θ(2− b2)
(1 + b)(4− 2b− b2) , u
B
i =
2(1− b)(2− b2)θ2
(1 + b)(4− 2b− b2)2 .
wholesale prices are strategic substitutes. Upstream firm i’s profit function with two-part tariffs is (pi−wi)qi. The second
cross derivative function for upstream firm i’s profit function is ∂2ui/∂wi∂wj = (∂
2pi/∂wi∂wj)qi+(∂pi/∂wi)(∂qi/∂wj)+
(∂pi/∂wj)(∂qi/∂wi) + (pi − c)(∂2qi/∂wi∂wj). Note that (∂2pi/∂wi∂wj) = 0 and (∂2qi/∂wi∂wj) = 0 by Eq. (1). We
also know that ∂qi/∂wj = b/(4 − b2), ∂qi/∂wi = −2/(4 − b2), ∂pi/∂wi = (2 − b2)/(4 − b2), and ∂pi/∂wj = b/(4 − b2).
Therefore, it is obvious that the sign of the second cross derivative function for upstream firm i’s is negative.
3For detail, consult to footnote 2.
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4 Sequential-move Game
4.1 Cournot Sequential-move Game
We now turn to the Cournot sequential-move game in which downstream firm j is the Stackelberg
leader. At stage three, given the two-part tariff contract and downstream firm j’s quantity, downstream
firm i (Stackelberg follower) sets the quantity so as to maximize its profit. Downstream firm i’s
maximization problem is as follows:
max
qi
pii = (pi − wi)qi − Fi = (1− qi − bqj − wi)qi − Fi,
Note that the sales quantity is independent of Fi. Therefore, downstream firm i chooses its sales
quantity and final good price as the function of wholesale price wi and downstream firm j’s quantity
as follows:
qi =
1− bqj − wi
2
.
Thus, price and downstream firm i’s profit at stage three is as follows:
pi =
1− bqj + wi
2
, pii =
(1− bqj − wi)2
4
− Fi.
At stage two, downstream firm j (Stackelberg leader) sets the sales quantity qj so as to maximize it’s
profit for given wholesale prices. Downstream firm j’s maximization problem is as follows:
max
qj
pij = (pj − wj)qj − Fj = [2− b− (2− b
2)qj − 2wj + bwi]qj
2
− Fj .
Downstream firm j chooses its quantity as the function of wholesale prices as follows:
qj =
2− b− 2wj + bwi
2(2− b2) .
Substituting the quantity into its rival’s quantity, retail prices and downstream firms’ profits, we obtain
the rival’s quantity, retail prices pi, and pj , and downstream firms’ profits pii, and pij .
qi =
4− 2b− b2 − (4− b2)wi + 2bwj
4(2− b2) , pj =
2− b+ 2wj + bwi
4
, pi =
4− b− b2 + 2bwj + (4− 3b2)wi
4(2− b2) ,
pij =
(2− b− 2wj + bwi)2
8(2− b2) − Fj , pii =
[4− 2b− b2 + 2bwj − (4− b2)wi]2
16(2− b2)2 − Fi.
Finally, we obtain the following results.
Lemma 3: If both wholesale prices are equal, downstream firm j has the first-mover advantage.
Proof: Suppose that wi = wj = w. Then, we obtain q
L
j − qFi = b
2(1−w)
4(2−b2) > 0 and p
F
i − pLj =
(1−b)b2(1−w)
4(2−b2) > 0. Define ∆q ≡ qLj − qFi and ∆p ≡ pFi − pLj . We have ∆q −∆p = b
3(1−w)
4(2−b2) > 0. There-
fore, if wi = wj = w, downstream firm j has the first-mover advantage in the downstream competition.
Q.E.D.
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At stage one, upstream firm i sets the retail price wi and franchise fee Fi so as to maximize it’s
profit for given wj . Upstream firm i’s maximization problem is as follows:
max
wi,Fi
ui = (wi − c)qi + Fi s.t. pii ≥ 0.
Note that the above constraint is binding. Therefore, we rewrite the above maximization problem as
follows:
max
wi
ui = (pi − c)qi = [4− 2b− b
2 + (4− 3b2)wi + 2bwj − 4(2− b2)c][4− 2b− b2 − (4− b2)wi + 2bwj ]
16(2− b2)2 .
On the other hand, upstream firm j’s maximization problem is as follows:
max
wj ,Fj
uj = (wj − c)qj + Fj s.t. pij ≥ 0.
Note that the above constraint is binding. Therefore, we rewrite the above maximization problem as
follows:
max
wj
uj = (pj − c)qj = [2− b+ bwi − 2wj ][2− b− 4c+ bwi + 2wj ]
8(2− b2) .
The equilibrium retail prices are derived as follows:
wLj = c, w
F
i = c−
b2θ(4− 2b− b2)
16− 16b2 + 3b4 ,
As θ = (1− c), we define a condition that wi ≥ 0, i.e., c ≥ [b2(4− 2b− b2)]/[16− 12b2 + b3− b4] where
the superscript ‘L’ denotes Stackelberg leader and ‘F ’ denotes Stackelberg follower. For the positive
value of wFi , we assume that c ≥ [b2(4− 2b− b2)]/[16− 12b2 + b3 − b4]. Note that the upstream firm
j (Stackelberg leader) sets the wholesale price to be equal to its marginal cost, while upstream firm i
(Stackelberg follower) sets the wholesale price to be below its marginal cost.
Using wLj , w
F
i and noting 1 − c = θ, we obtain the quantities, retail prices, and upstream firms’
profits as follows:
Lemma 4: Suppose a sequential-move Cournot competition. Under Eq. (1), if each upstream firm of-
fers two-part tariff contracts to its downstream firms, the equilibrium quantities, retail prices, upstream
firms’ profits and fixed fees are respectively given by
qLj =
(8− 4b− 4b2 + b3)θ
16− 16b2 + 3b4 , q
F
i =
(4− 2b− b2)θ
8− 6b2 ,
pLj = c+
(16− 8b− 16b2 + 6b3 + 4b4 − b5)θ
2(16− 16b2 + 3b4) , p
F
i = c+
(4− 2b− b2)θ
2(4− b2) ,
uLj =
(2− b2)(8− 4b− 4b2 + b3)2θ2
2(16− 16b2 + 3b4)2 , u
F
i =
(4− 2b− b2)2θ2
4(16− 16b2 + 3b4) ,
FLj =
(2− b2)(8− 4b− 4b2 + b3)2θ2
2(16− 16b2 + 3b4)2 , F
F
i =
(4− 2b− b2)2θ2
4(4− 3b2)2 .
We summarize these findings in Proposition 1.
Proposition 1: Under Eq. (1), the upstream firm in which its downstream firm moves second sets
the wholesale price to be below the marginal cost, while the rival in which its downstream firm moves
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first sets the wholesale price to be equal to the marginal cost.
Proposition 1 can be explained as follows. Profit for downstream firm i (Stackelberg follower) is given
by pii(qi, qj , wi) = (1− qi− bqj −wi)qi−Fi. So, downstream firm i’s best-response function is given by
BRi(qj , wi) = (1−wi− bqj)/2. Thus, pij(qj , BRi, wi, wj) = (1− qj − b(1−wi− bqj)/2)qj −wjqj −Fj .
Note that now the upstream firms’ payoffs differ from those of their downstream firms. Setting
the derivative of uj(wi, wj) with respect to wj equal to zero and simplifying yields the first-order
condition: (c− wj)/(2− b2) = 0 for all wi. Thus, we find it is a dominant strategy for upstream firm
j to set wholesale price equal to marginal cost when downstream firm j is a Stackelberg leader in the
downstream market4.
More specifically, the intuition behind this is as follows. Recall that upstream firm j’s payoff is
given by uj(wi, wj) = (wj − c)qj + pij{qj(wi, wj), BRi[qj(wi, wj), wi, wj ]}. This payoff depends on wi
both directly and indirectly through qj(wi, wj). Moreover, downstream firm i plays according to its
best response that depends on qj and wi, but not direct on wj . Essentially, upstream firm j can
influence downstream i only indirectly through its impact on qj , which then affects downstream firm
i’s best response BRi. If downstream j is a Stackelberg leader, it already considered this impact of
qj on BRi in the choice of qj . More formally, by the envelope theorem (since pij is maximized already
by qj), the optimal wj solves:
∂uj(wi, wj)
∂wj
=
∂pij{qj(wi, wj), BRi[qj(wi, wj), wi, wj ]}
∂wj
+ qj(wi, wj) + (wj − c)
[
∂qj
∂wj
]
= 0.
Since
∂pij{qj(wi,wj),BRi[qj(wi,wj),wi,wj ]}
∂wj
= −qj , this reduces to ∂uj(wi,wj)∂wj = (wj − c)
∂qj
∂wj
= 0. Since
∂qj
∂wj
< 0, it follows that the optimal wj = c for all wi. This result simplifies the determination of
upstream firm i’s optimal wholesale price wi, since we can substitute wj = c into upstream firm i’s
objective function ui(wi, wj) before proceeding. Differentiating ui(wi, c) with respect to wi, we obtain
wFi = c− θb
2(4−2b−b2)
16−16b2+3b4 . Thus, upstream firm i set the wholesale price to be below its marginal cost.
We now compare outputs and profits. Under the two-part tariffs contract, the Stackelberg leader’s
output is less than that of the Stackelberg follower. This is the contrast to the case under the linear
pricing contract, in which the Stackelberg leader’s output is more than that of the Stackelberg follower.
We now turn to the upstream firm’s profits. It can be easily shown that uLj < u
F
i ; that is, Stackelberg
leader is strongly disadvantageous under the two-part tariffs contract. We summarize these results in
Proposition 2.
Proposition 2: Under Eq. (1), (i) qFi > q
L
j for all b; and (ii) u
F
i > u
L
j for all b.
Proof: From equations in Lemma 2, we obtain qFi > q
L
j = b
4θ/[2(16− 16b2 + 3b4)]. Therefore, down-
stream firm i’s output is larger than that of downstream firm j. On the other hand, from equations
in Lemma 2, we obtain uFi − uLj = b
5(16−16b−4b2+5b3)θ2
4(16−16b2+3b4)2 . Therefore, the upstream firm i’s profits are
higher than those of the downstream firm j. Q.E.D.
Proposition 2 suggests that under Eq. (1), the upstream firm in which its downstream firm moves
second in a downstream competition earns higher profits than the other in which its downstream firm
moves first in a downstream competition.
4As in Lemma 2, if wi = wj in stage three, the downstream firm j has the first-mover advantage in the sense of
comparing outputs and retail prices. Hence, the follower’s upstream firm i has incentive to remove the first-mover
advantage of downstream firm j. That is, the upstream firm i wants to set its wholesale price to be below its marginal
cost in order to obtain an advantage in downstream competition.
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The intuition behind Proposition 2 is as follows. At the downstream competition, the Stackelberg
leader has the first-mover advantage (qj > qi). However, The follower’s upstream firm has an incentive
to set a lower wholesale price than that of the leader’s upstream firm at stage one. The above two
effects play important roles in competition. The effect of wholesale price on competition is larger the
effect of the first-mover advantage. In the end, we show that the standard conclusions regarding the
sequential Cournot competition can be reversed in a vertical market.
To understand the relationship between a simultaneous-move game and a sequential-move game,
straightforward computation yields as follows:
uCi − uFi =
−b8θ2
4(4 + 2b− b2)2(16− 16b2 + 3b4) ,
uCi − uLi =
b5(2− b2)(64− 64b2 + 12b4 − b5)θ2
2(4 + 2b− b2)2(16− 16b2 + 3b4)2 .
Thus, we summarize these results in Proposition 3.
Proposition 3: Under Eq. (1), we have the following results that uFi > u
C
i > u
L
i .
The intuition behind Proposition 3 is as follows. In a simultaneous-move Cournot game, downstream
firm i perceives the output produced by downstream firm j as given. However, in a sequential-move
Cournot game, downstream firm j knows downstream firm i’s best-response function. Therefore,
downstream firm j has an incentive to increase its output. On the other hand, the downstream firm
i will reduce its output level in response to downstream firm i’s output level. However, anticipating
such downstream firms’ strategies, the follower’s upstream firm has the incentive to set the wholesale
price to be below its marginal cost. Hence, when the wholesale price wFi is lower than the wholesale
price wCi . Therefore, we have the Proposition 3.
4.2 Bertrand Sequential-move Game
Now consider the sequential-move game in which firm j is arbitrarily designated the Stackelberg leader
under Bertrand competition. At stage three, the downstream firm i’s maximization problem is
max
pi
pii = (pi − wi)qi − Fi = (pi − wi)(1− b+ bpj − pi)
1− b2 − Fi; i, j = 1, 2, i 6= j.
Note that the input price is independent of Fi. Therefore, downstream firm i chooses its sales price
as the function of wholesale price wi and downstream firm i’s sales price pi as follows:
pi =
1− b+ bpj + wi
2
.
Substituting retail price pi into downstream firm i’s output and profit, we obtain the output and
profit.
qi =
1− b+ bpj − wi
2(1− b2) , pii =
(1− b+ bpj − wi)2
4(1− b2) − Fi.
At stage two, downstream firm j sets the final good price pj so as to maximize it’s profit for given
wholesale prices. Downstream firm j’s maximization problem is as follows:
max
pj
pij =
(pj − wj)[2− b− b2 − (2− b2)pj + bwi]
2(1− b2) − Fj .
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Downstream firm j chooses its retail price as the function of wholesale prices as follows:
pj =
2− b− b2 + (2− b2)wj + bwi
2(2− b2) .
Thus, it is straightforward that the equilibrium quantities qi, qj , rival’s retail price pi, and pay-offs pii,
and pij are derived at stage two:
qj =
2− b− b2 − (2− b2)wj + bwi
4(1− b2) ,
qi =
4− 2b− 3b2 + b3 + (2− b2)bwj − (4− 3b2)wi
4(2− 3b2 + b4) ,
pi =
4− 2b− 3b2 + b3 + b(2− b2)wj + (4− b2)wi
4(2− b2) ,
pij =
[2− b− b2 − (2− b2)wj + bwi]2
8(2− 3b2 + b4) − Fj ,
pii =
[4− 2b− 3b2 + b3 + (2− b2)bwi − (4− 3b2)wj ]2
16(1− b2)(2− b2)2 − Fi.
Finally, we obtain the following results.
Lemma 5: If both wholesale prices are equal, downstream firm i has the second-mover advantage.
Proof: We assume that wi = wj = w. Then, we obtain qj − qi = b
2(1−w)
4(2−b2) > 0 and pi − pj =
(1−b)b2(1−w)
4(2−b2) > 0. Define ∆q ≡ qj − qi and∆p ≡ pi − pj . We have ∆q −∆p = b
3(1−w)
4(2−b2) > 0. Therefore,
downstream firm i has the second-mover advantage in the downstream competition. Q.E.D.
At stage one, the upstream firm i sets the input price wi and the franchise fee Fi so as to maximize
it’s profit for given wj . Upstream firm i’s maximization problem is as follows:
max
wi,Fi
ui = (wi − c)qi + Fi s.t. pii ≥ 0.
Note that the above constraint is binding. Therefore, we rewrite the above maximization problem
as follows:
max
wi
ui = (pi − c)qi = [4− 2b− 3b
2 + b3 − (4− 3b2)wi + 2bwj(1− b2)][K]
16(2− b2)2(1− b2) ,
where K = 4− 2b− 3b2 + b3 + (4− b2)wi + 2bwj(1− b2)− 4c(2− b2).
On the other hand, the upstream firm j’s maximization problem
max
wj ,Fj
uj = (wj − c)qj + Fj s.t. pij ≥ 0.
Noting that the above constraint is binding, we also rewrite the maximization problem as with the
upstream firm j of Stackelberg leader:
max
wj
uj = (pj − c)qj = [2− b− b
2 + (2− b2)wj + bwi][2− b− b2 − 2c(2− b2) + (2− b2)wj + bwi]
8(2− 3b2 + b4) .
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From the equilibrium values and input prices, we obtain response functions, wi and wj under the
Bertrand sequential-moves competition as follows:
wlj = c, w
f
i = c+
b2(4− 2b− 3b2 + b3)θ
16− 16b2 + 3b4 ,
where the superscript ‘l’ denotes Stackelberg leader and ‘f ’ denotes Stackelberg follower.
Note that upstream firm j (Stackelberg leader) sets the wholesale price to be equal to its marginal
cost, while upstream firm i (Stackelberg follower) sets the wholesale price to be above its marginal
cost. Using wlj , w
f
i , and θ, we obtain the following results.
Lemma 6: Suppose a sequential-move Bertrand competition. Under Eq. (1), if each upstream firm
offers two-part tariffs contract to each downstream firm, the equilibrium quantities, retail prices, up-
stream firms’ profits and fixed fees are respectively given by
qlj =
θ(2− b2)(8 + 4b− 4b2 − b3)
2(2− b)(1 + b)(2 + b)(4− 3b2) , q
f
i =
θ(4 + 2b− b2)
2(4 + 4b− b2 − b3) ,
plj =
8− 4b− 8b2 + 3b3 + b4 − b5 + c(8 + 4b− 8b2 − 3b3 + 2b4)
16− 16b2 + 3b4 ,
pfi =
4− 2b− 3b2 + b3 + c(4 + 2b− 3b2 − b3)
8− 6b2 ,
ulj =
θ2(1− b)(2− b2)(8 + 4b− 4b2 − b3)2
2(1 + b)(16− 16b2 + 3b4)2 , u
f
i =
θ2(1− b)(4 + 2b− b2)2
4(1 + b)(16− 16b2 + 3b4) .
We summarize these findings in Proposition 4.
Proposition 4: Under Eq. (1) qlj > q
f
i for 0 < b ≤ 1; and ulj > ufi for 0 < b ≤ 1
Proof: From equations in Lemma 6, we obtain qlj − qfi > 0. Therefore, downstream firm j’s sales
volume is larger than that of downstream firm i. In addition, from equations in Lemma 6, we ob-
tain ulj − ufi = b
5(16−20b2−b3+5b4)θ2
4(1−b)(16−16b2+3b4)2 . Therefore, the upstream firm in which its downstream firm
moves first in a downstream Stackelberg Bertrand competition earns higher profits than the other
in which its downstream firm moves second in a downstream Stackelberg Bertrand competition.
Q.E.D.
We now turn to the relationship between a simultaneous-move game and sequential-move game,
straightforward computation yields as follows:
uBi − ufi =
−b8(1− b)θ2
4(1 + b)(16− 16b2 + 3b4)(4− 2b− b2)2 regardless of nature of goods,
uBi − uli =
−b5(1− b)θ2(2− b2)(64− 64b2 + 12b4 + b5)
2(1 + b)(16− 16b2 + 3b4)2(4− 2b− b2)2 < (>)0,
when the goods are subsitutes (complements).
Thus, we summarize these results in Proposition 5.
Proposition 5: Under Eq. (1), we have the following results that uli > u
f
i > u
B
i for b ∈ (0, 1).
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The intuition behind Proposition 5 is as follows. In a simultaneous-move Cournot game, downstream
firm i perceives the output produced by downstream firm j as given. However, in a sequential-move
Cournot game, downstream firm j knows downstream firm i’s best-response function. Therefore,
downstream firm j has an incentive to increase its retail price. On the other hand, the downstream
firm i will decrease its retail price in response to downstream firm i’s retail price. However, anticipating
such downstream firms’ strategies, the follower’s upstream firm has the incentive to set the wholesale
price to be above its marginal cost. Hence, the wholesale price wfi is lower than the wholesale price
wBi . Therefore, we have the Proposition 5.
5 Concluding Remarks
In the present study, we investigated the issue of the first- and the second-mover advantages in a
vertical structure in which each upstream firm trades with a separated retailer via two-part tariffs.
We have shown that under Cournot (Bertrand) competition, the follower’s upstream firm has the
incentive to set the input price to be below (above) its marginal cost, while leader’s upstream firm
has the incentive to set the input price equal to marginal cost. This implies that the upstream
firm resolves the first- or second-mover advantage by providing for differential input prices to the
downstream firms. Hence, when the goods are substitutes, the upstream firm in which its downstream
firm moves first under Courtnot (Bertrand) competition earns lower (higher) profits than the other
in which its downstream firm moves second in a downstream Courtnot (Bertrand) competition, and
vice versa when the goods are complements. This result is in stark contrast to the result under one-
tier market, which already has explained as in Introduction. Hence, unlike the literature of one-tier
without the vertical structure context, we have analyzed that the upstream firms’ preference orderings
over sequential versus simultaneous play are reversed in a vertical structure under either Cournot or
Bertrand competitions when each upstream firm trades with a separated retailer via two-part tariffs.
We conclude by discussing the limitations and extensions of our paper. We have used a simplified
model without negotiation or asymmetric information between upstream and downstream firms. We
do not consider asymmetric costs between downstream firms, either. Moreover, we need to examine
intermediate goods markets where an upstream firm negotiates sequentially with two downstream firms
and to consider nonlinear demand structures with negotiation between simultaneous and sequential
moves. The extensions of our model in these directions are left for future research. Moreover, we
expect the basic results of our paper to hold in these extended settings as well.
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